I am an economic theorist with broad interests that include mechanism design, collective choice, mathematical methods and communication.

I’m currently completing a PhD at Northwestern.

I am on the job market. [link to my job market website]

*Working papers*

**Screening for breakthroughs** with Gregorio Curello (Bonn)

job market paper

An agent privately observes a technological breakthrough that expands utility possibilities, and must be incentivised to disclose it. The principal controls the agent’s utility over time, and cannot use monetary transfers. Optimal mechanisms keep the agent only just willing to disclose promptly. In an important case, a *deadline mechanism* is optimal: absent disclosure, the agent enjoys an efficient high utility before a deadline, and an inefficiently low utility afterward. In general, optimal mechanisms feature a (possibly gradual) transition from the former to the latter. Even if monetary transfers are permitted, they play no incentive role in optimal mechanisms, and may not be used at all. We apply our results to unemployment insurance and to task delegation in organisations.

**The converse envelope theorem**

R&R at *Econometrica*

I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula is *equivalent* to a first-order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal’s (2002) envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I use the converse envelope theorem to extend to abstract outcomes the canonical result in mechanism design that any increasing allocation is implementable, and apply this to selling information.

**Agenda-manipulation in ranking** with Gregorio Curello (Bonn)

[video, slides] [longer slides]

A committee ranks a set of alternatives by sequentially voting on pairs, in an order chosen by the committee’s chair. Although the chair has no knowledge of voters’ preferences, we show that she can do as well as if she had perfect information. We characterise strategies with this ‘regret-freeness’ property in two ways: (1) they are *efficient,* and (2) they avoid two intuitive errors. One regret-free strategy is a sorting algorithm called *insertion sort.* We show that it is characterised by a lexicographic property, and is outcome-equivalent to a recursive variant of the much-studied *amendment procedure.*

**Strategic research funding** with Matteo Escudé (LUISS)

We study a dynamic game in which information arrives gradually as long as a principal funds research, and an agent takes an action in each period. In equilibrium, the principal’s patience is the key determinant of her information provision: the lower her discount rate, the more eagerly she funds. When she is sufficiently patient, her information provision and value function are well-approximated by the ‘Bayesian persuasion’ model. If the conflict of interest is purely belief-based and information is valuable, then she provides full information if she is patient. We also obtain a sharp characterisation of the principal’s value function. Our proofs rely on a novel dynamic programming principle rooted in the theory of viscosity solutions of differential equations.

**The preference lattice** with Gregorio Curello (Bonn)

Most comparisons of preferences have the structure of *single-crossing dominance.* We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and uniqueness results for minimum upper bounds of arbitrary sets of preferences. We apply these theorems to monotone comparative statics, ambiguity- and risk-aversion and social choice.

*Published papers*

**Strictly strategy-proof auctions** with Matteo Escudé (LUISS)

*Mathematical Social Sciences, 107,* 13–16. [published version]

A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use *strictly* dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to *strict* monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is ‘essentially for free’.

*Work in progress*

**Delayed disclosure** with Francisco Poggi (Northwestern)

A principal owns a project, and recruits an agent to learn about its viability. The agent’s participation over time is observable and costly. Learning is private, allowing the agent to delay the (verifiable) disclosure of any discoveries. The principal incentivises the agent by promising a (history-dependent and possibly random) share of any revenue generated. What is the optimal contract?